G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP5710
DP5710 Sovereign Debt Restructuring: the Judge, the Vultures and Creditor Rights
Marcus Miller; Dania Thomas
发表日期2006-06-16
出版年2006
语种英语
摘要Strategic patenting is widely believed to raise the costs of innovating, especially in industries characterised by cumulative innovation. This paper studies the effects of strategic patenting on R&D, patenting and market value in the computer software industry. We focus on two key aspects: patent portfolio size which affects bargaining power in patent disputes, and the fragmentation of patent rights ('patent thickets') which increases the transaction costs of enforcement. We develop a model that incorporates both effects, together with R&D spillovers. Using panel data for the period 1980-99, we find evidence that both strategic patenting and R&D spillovers strongly affect innovation and market value of software firms.
主题International Trade and Regional Economics
关键词Patents Anti-commons Patent thickets R&d spillovers Market value
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp5710
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534551
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Marcus Miller,Dania Thomas. DP5710 Sovereign Debt Restructuring: the Judge, the Vultures and Creditor Rights. 2006.
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