| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5722 |
| DP5722 Stock Price Informativeness, Cross-Listings and Investment Decisions | |
| Thomas Gehrig; Thierry Foucault | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-06-16 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | I consider a model where a principal decides whether to produce one unit of an indivisible good (e.g. a private school) and which characteristics it will contain (emphasis on language or science). Agents (parents) are differentiated along two substitutable dimensions: a vertical parameter that captures their privately known valuation for the good (demand for private education), and an horizontal parameter that captures their observable differences in preferences for the characteristics. I analyze the optimal mechanism offered by the principal to allocate the good and show that the principal will produce a good with characteristics more on the lines of the preferences of the agent with the lowest valuation. Furthermore, if the principal has also a private valuation for the good, he will bias the choice of the characteristics against his own preferences. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Allocation mechanisms Non-excludable goods Vertical and horizontal differentiation Mechanism design Externalities |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5722 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534554 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thomas Gehrig,Thierry Foucault. DP5722 Stock Price Informativeness, Cross-Listings and Investment Decisions. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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