| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5712 |
| DP5712 Bargaining for Bribes: The Role of Institutions | |
| Raymond Fisman; Roberta Gatti | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-06-23 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In models with heterogeneous firms trade integration has a positive impact on aggregate productivity through the selection of the best firms as import competition drives the least productive ones out of the market. To quantify the impact of firm selection on productivity, we calibrate and simulate a multi-country multi-sector model with monopolistic competition and variable markups using firm-level data and aggregate trade figures on a panel of 11 EU countries. We find that EU trade has a sizeable impact on aggregate productivity. In 2000 the introduction of prohibitive trade barriers would have caused an average productivity loss of roughly 13 per cent, whereas a reduction of intra-EU trade costs by 5 per cent would have generated a productivity gain of roughly 2 per cent. Productivity losses and gains, however, vary a lot across countries and sectors depending on market accessibility and trade costs. We provide evidence that our results are robust to alternative distance and productivity measures. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | European integration Firm-level data Firm selection Gains from trade Total factor productivity |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5712 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534562 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Raymond Fisman,Roberta Gatti. DP5712 Bargaining for Bribes: The Role of Institutions. 2006. |
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