G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP5713
DP5713 CEO Compensation and Strategy Inertia
Roman Inderst; Holger Mueller
发表日期2006-06-23
出版年2006
语种英语
摘要What role did the US courts play in the Argentine debt swap of 2005? What are the implications for the future of creditor rights in sovereign bond markets? The judge in the Argentine case has, it appears, deftly exploited creditor heterogeneity ? between holdouts seeking capital gains and institutional investors wanting a settlement ? to promote a swap with a supermajority of 76% of creditors. Our analysis of Argentine debt litigation reveals a process of 'judge-mediated' sovereign debt restructuring, which resolves the key issues of Transition and Aggregation - two of the roles envisaged for the IMF's still-born Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM). For the future we note how the judge-mediated sovereign debt restructuring, together with creditor committees, may complement the market-based alternative promoted by the Treasury, namely collective action clauses (CACs) in sovereign bond contracts.
主题International Macroeconomics
关键词Sovereign debt restructuring Holdout creditors Collective action clauses
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp5713
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534563
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Roman Inderst,Holger Mueller. DP5713 CEO Compensation and Strategy Inertia. 2006.
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