| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5720 |
| DP5720 Remittances and the Brain Drain | |
| Riccardo Faini | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-06-23 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | As the performance of long-term projects is not observable in the short run politicians may pander to public opinion. To solve this problem, we propose a triple mechanism involving political information markets, reelection threshold contracts, and democratic elections. An information market is used to predict the long-term performance of a policy, while threshold contracts stipulate a price level on the political information market that a politician must reach to have the right to stand for reelection. Reelection thresholds are offered by politicians during campaigns. We show that, on balance, the triple mechanism increases social welfare. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Elections Threshold contracts Democracy Information markets Triple mechanism |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5720 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534565 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Riccardo Faini. DP5720 Remittances and the Brain Drain. 2006. |
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