| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5738 |
| DP5738 Openness, Inequality and Poverty: Endowments Matter | |
| Jaime de Melo; Julien Gourdon; Nicolas Maystre | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-07-03 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper considers the joint optimal design of CEOs' on-the-job compensation and severance pay in a general optimal contracting framework. We obtain a novel argument for high-powered, non-linear CEO compensation such as bonus schemes and option grants that is different from existing arguments based on moral hazard and risk taking. Based on this argument, the CEO's optimal on-the-job compensation scheme is designed to minimize the use of costly severance pay to reduce CEO entrenchment, thus minimizing the CEO's informational rents. Our model generates novel empirical predictions concerning the interrelation of CEOs' on-the-job compensation and severance pay as well as CEO turnover which, to the extent that they have been tested, are consistent with the empirical evidence. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Ceo compensation Entrenchment Stock options |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5738 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534580 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jaime de Melo,Julien Gourdon,Nicolas Maystre. DP5738 Openness, Inequality and Poverty: Endowments Matter. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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