| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP5735
|
| DP5735 Cognitive Abilities and Portfolio Choice |
| Tullio Jappelli; Mario Padula
|
| 发表日期 | 2006-07-05
|
| 出版年 | 2006
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We consider an imperfectly competitive loan market in which a local (e.g., relationship) lender has valuable soft, albeit private, information, which gives her a competitive advantage vis-à-vis distant transaction lenders who provide arm?s-length financing based on hard, publicly available information. The competitive pressure from transaction lenders forces the local lender to leave surplus to borrowers, which distorts the local lender?s credit decision in the sense that she inefficiently rejects marginally profitable projects. Collateral mitigates this inefficiency by 'flattening' the local lender?s payoff function, thus improving her payoff from precisely those projects that she inefficiently rejects. Our model predicts that technological innovations such as small business credit scoring that narrow the information advantage of local lenders vis-à-vis transaction lenders lead to higher collateral requirements, thus strengthening the role of collateral in local lending relationships. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
|
| 关键词 | Collateral
Soft information
Relationship lending vs transaction lending
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5735
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534584
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Tullio Jappelli,Mario Padula. DP5735 Cognitive Abilities and Portfolio Choice. 2006.
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