| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5753 |
| DP5753 Jostling for Advantage: Licensing and Entry into Patent Portfolio Races | |
| Ralph Siebert; Georg von Graevenitz | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-07-11 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In a dynamic labor market worker-firm matches dissolve frequently causing workers to separate and firms to look for replacements. A separation may be initiated by the worker (a quit) or the firm (a layoff), or may result from a joint decision. A dissolution of a worker-firm match may be inefficient if it can be prevented by wage renegotiation. In this paper we study worker separations in the Dutch labor market. From an analysis of matched worker-firm data we conclude that both quits and layoffs are less likely to occur in high quality matches. We also find that workers with a high propensity to quit are offered higher wages to prevent them to quit. Similarly, workers with a high layoff probability give up some of their wage to prevent them from being laid-off. Despite these wage renegotiations some inefficiency in separations remains. However, there is a clear difference between quits and layoffs. Whereas inefficient quits are rare inefficient layoffs occur frequently. These phenomena may be related to downward wage rigidity. While it is easy to renegotiate higher wages to prevent quits it is much more difficult to renegotiate lower wages to prevent layoffs even if that would overall be beneficial to the workers involved. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Separations Quits Layoffs Matched worker-firm dataset |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5753 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534592 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ralph Siebert,Georg von Graevenitz. DP5753 Jostling for Advantage: Licensing and Entry into Patent Portfolio Races. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
