| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5751 |
| DP5751 Legal Costs as Barriers to Trade | |
| Tanguy van Ypersele; Alessandro Turrini | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-07-17 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Licensing in a patent thicket allows firms to either avoid or resolve hold-up. Firms? R&D incentives depend on whether they license ex ante or ex post. We develop a model of a patent portfolio race, which allows for endogenous R&D efforts, to study firms? choice between ex ante and ex post licensing. The model shows that firms? relationships in product markets and technology space jointly determine the type of licensing contract chosen. In particular, product market competitors are more likely to avoid patent portfolio races, since the threat of hold-up increases. On the other hand, more valuable technologies are more likely to give rise to patent portfolio races. We also discuss the welfare implications of these results. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Hold-up problem Licensing Innovation Patent race Patent thicket Research joint ventures |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5751 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534600 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Tanguy van Ypersele,Alessandro Turrini. DP5751 Legal Costs as Barriers to Trade. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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