| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5762 |
| DP5762 Do Credible Domestic Institutions Promote Credible International Agreements? | |
| Carlo Perroni; Paola Conconi | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-07-17 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Consider a revenue-maximizing seller who can sell an object to one of n potential buyers. Each buyer either has hard information about his valuation (i.e., evidence that cannot be forged) or is ignorant. The optimal mechanism is characterized. It turns out that more ignorance can increase the expected total surplus. Even when the buyers are ex ante symmetric, the object may be sold to a buyer who does not have the largest willingness-to-pay. Nevertheless, an additional buyer increases the expected total surplus in the symmetric case, whereas more competition can be harmful if there are ex ante asymmetries. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Mechanism design Hard information |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5762 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534604 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Carlo Perroni,Paola Conconi. DP5762 Do Credible Domestic Institutions Promote Credible International Agreements?. 2006. |
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