| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5803 |
| DP5803 Upstream Competition and Downstream Buyer Power | |
| Howard Smith; John Thanassoulis | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-08-18 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Conventional economic wisdom suggests because of the aging process, social security systems will have to be retrenched. In particular, retirement age will have to be largely increased. Yet, is this policy measure feasible in OECD countries? Since the answer belongs mainly to the realm of politics, I evaluate the political feasibility of postponing retirement under aging in France, Italy, the UK, and the US. Simulations for the year 2050 steady state demographic, economic and political scenario suggest that retirement age will be postponed in all countries, while the social security contribution rate will rise in all countries, but Italy. The political support for increasing the retirement age stems mainly from the negative income effect induced by aging, which reduces the profitability of the existing social security system, and thus the individuals net social security wealth. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Political equilibria Aging Postponing retirement |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5803 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534639 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Howard Smith,John Thanassoulis. DP5803 Upstream Competition and Downstream Buyer Power. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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