| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5802 |
| DP5802 When Does Coordination Require Centralization? | |
| Niko Matouschek; Wouter Dessein; Ricardo Alonso | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-08-30 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper considers buyer power in the presence of upstream competition to supply a homogeneous product. A likely consequence of upstream competition is that each supplier is uncertain of its final output, because it does not know how many downstream buyers will select it as a seller. We present a model where, for this reason, final volumes are uncertain for each seller. We find a new source of buyer power when the surplus function is nonlinear: the event of negotiation with a large buyer increases the seller's expected output, which changes the expected average net surplus from the deal; this increases buyer power when the seller's surplus function is concave (and diminishes it when convex). We explore consequences for welfare, industry productivity, and investment incentives. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Buyer power |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5802 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534645 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Niko Matouschek,Wouter Dessein,Ricardo Alonso. DP5802 When Does Coordination Require Centralization?. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
