| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5810 |
| DP5810 Export Promotion Agencies: What Works and What Doesn't | |
| Marcelo Olarreaga; Daniel Lederman; Lucy Payton | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-08-30 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper we apply the Bresnahan-Lau (1982) model to test for market power in the European distribution of salmon. In this particular setting, the model also incorporates a test of whether dumping takes place over time. Utilising data at the import level, derived demand equations are specified rather then consumer demand. From 1997 a so-called salmon agreement that implied minimum prices, a growth ceiling and a feeding restriction program for Norwegian farmers was imposed. Here we test whether the agreement resulted in an increase in the Norwegian market power. The results suggest that Norway did not have market power prior to the salmon agreement, and we find no indication that dumping was taking place. However, the agreement led to Norwegian market power after 1997. It is interesting to note that the agreement was initiated to prevent anti dumping duty of 13% that Norwegian farmers would have to pay otherwise. The increase in mark-up from imposing the agreement is found to be in the order of 14-15%, suggesting that the Norwegian farmers saved a fee of 13% and gained a markup that was even higher. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Anti-dumping market power Salmon markets |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5810 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534648 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marcelo Olarreaga,Daniel Lederman,Lucy Payton. DP5810 Export Promotion Agencies: What Works and What Doesn't. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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