| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5814 |
| DP5814 Buyer Power and Quality Improvements | |
| Michele Polo; Chiara Fumagalli; Pierpaolo Battigalli | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-09-04 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We model a situation where the entrepreneur has an informational advantage during the early stages of an investment project while the venture capitalist has the informational advantage during the later stages. We examine how this evolution of informational asymmetry affects venture investment and the nature of financing contracts under two different scenarios with regard to the distribution of bargaining power between the venture capitalist and entrepreneur: when the venture capitalist has the bargaining advantage and when the entrepreneur has the bargaining advantage. Our results demonstrate that the distribution of bargaining power has a profound influence both on the terms of contracts and on investments in venture-backed projects. Changes in bargaining power can completely alter the payoff sensitivity of contracts offered to entrepreneurs, and, as witnessed in the recent past, when entrepreneurs hold the bargaining advantage, venture capitalists may acquiesce to excessive investments in early stages of projects and subsequently terminate a larger number of projects. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Asymmetric information Financial contracting Venture capital Bargaining power Investment distortions |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5814 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534653 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michele Polo,Chiara Fumagalli,Pierpaolo Battigalli. DP5814 Buyer Power and Quality Improvements. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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