| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5795 |
| DP5795 General Equilibrium and the Emergence of (Non) Market Clearing Trading Institutions | |
| Georg Kirchsteiger; Carlos Alos-Ferrer | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-09-08 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyses the sources of buyer power and its effect on sellers? investment in quality improvements. In our model retailers make take-it-or-leave-it offers to a producer and each of them obtains its marginal contribution to total profits (gross of sunk costs). In turn, this depends on the rivalry between retailers in the bargaining process. Rivalry increases when retailers are less differentiated and when decreasing returns to scale in production are larger. The allocation of total surplus affects the incentives of the producer to invest in product quality, an instance of the hold-up problem. An increase in buyer power not only makes the supplier and consumers worse off, but it may even harm retailers, that obtain a larger share of a smaller surplus. A repeated game argument shows that efficient quality improvements can be supported as an equilibrium outcome if the producer and retailers are involved in a long-term relationship. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Buyer power Non-cooperative bargaining Hold-up |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5795 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534658 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Georg Kirchsteiger,Carlos Alos-Ferrer. DP5795 General Equilibrium and the Emergence of (Non) Market Clearing Trading Institutions. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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