G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP5826
DP5826 On the Extent of Re-Entitlement Effects in Unemployment Compensation
Laurence Rioux; Javier Ortega
发表日期2006-09-08
出版年2006
语种英语
摘要The paper reviews the recent evolution of leniency programs for cartels in the US and EU, surveys their theoretical economic analyses, and discusses the empirical and experimental evidence available, also looking briefly at related experiences of rewarding whistleblowers in other fields of law enforcement. It concludes with a list of desiderata for leniency and whistleblower reward programs, simple suggestions how to improve current ones, and an agenda for future research. The issues discussed appear relevant to the fight of other forms of multiagent organized crime - like auditor-manager collusion, financial fraud, or corruption - that share with cartels the crucial features that well designed leniency and whistleblower programs exploit.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Amnesty Antitrust Cartels Collusion Corruption Competition policy Corporate crime Deterrence Immunity Leniency
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp5826
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534663
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Laurence Rioux,Javier Ortega. DP5826 On the Extent of Re-Entitlement Effects in Unemployment Compensation. 2006.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Laurence Rioux]的文章
[Javier Ortega]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Laurence Rioux]的文章
[Javier Ortega]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Laurence Rioux]的文章
[Javier Ortega]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。