| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5817 |
| DP5817 (In)Transparency of Information Acquisition: A Bargaining Experiment | |
| Thomas Gehrig; Werner Güth; René Levínsky | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-09-17 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We estimate tax multipliers in a "Blanchard-Yaari" consumption model where Ricardian equivalence is broken because the private sector discounts the future at a faster rate than the real rate of interest. The model fits U.S. data since 1955 extremely well-entailing a discount wedge of around 20 percent a year and fiscal multipliers of 0.15-0.4-depending on the permanence of the change in taxes/transfers, and is much superior to one that assumes some consumers are fully Ricardian and others follow simple rules of thumb. The implied high private sector rate of discount has wide implications for policymakers. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Fiscal policy Fiscal multipliers Ricardian equivalence Discount rates |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5817 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534666 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thomas Gehrig,Werner Güth,René Levínsky. DP5817 (In)Transparency of Information Acquisition: A Bargaining Experiment. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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