| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5844 |
| DP5844 Multi-Stage Contests with Stochastic Ability | |
| Dan Kovenock; Kai Konrad | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-09-17 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider the properties of perfectly discriminating contests in which players' abilities are stochastic, but become common knowledge before efforts are expended. Players whose expected ability is lower than that of their rivals may still earn a positive expected payoff from participating in the contest, which may explain why they participate. We also show that an increase in the dispersion of a player's own ability generally benefits this player. It may benefit or harm his rival, but cannot benefit the rival more than it benefits himself. We also explore the role of stochastic ability for sequential contests with the same opponent (multi-battle contests) and with varying opponents (elimination tournaments) and show that it reduces the strong discouragement effects and hold-up problems that may otherwise emerge in such games. High own ability dispersion selects such players into the contest and favors them in elimination contests. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | All-pay auction Elimination tournament Contest Race Conflict Multi-stage Random ability Discouragement |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5844 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534682 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dan Kovenock,Kai Konrad. DP5844 Multi-Stage Contests with Stochastic Ability. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Dan Kovenock]的文章 |
| [Kai Konrad]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Dan Kovenock]的文章 |
| [Kai Konrad]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Dan Kovenock]的文章 |
| [Kai Konrad]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
