| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5843 |
| DP5843 The Allocation of European Union Allowances. Lessons, Unifying Themes and General Principles | |
| Carlo Carraro; A Denny Ellerman; Barbara Buchner | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-09-23 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We investigate the outcome of bargaining when a player?s pay-off from agreement is risky. We find that a risk-averse player typically increases his equilibrium receipts when his pay-off is made risky. This is because the presence of risk makes individuals behave 'more patiently' in bargaining. Strong analogies are drawn to the precautionary saving literature. We show that the effect of risk on receipts can be sufficiently strong that a decreasingly risk-averse player may be better off receiving a risky pay-off than a certain pay-off. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Nash bargaining Rubinstein bargaining Risk aversion Prudence |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5843 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534683 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Carlo Carraro,A Denny Ellerman,Barbara Buchner. DP5843 The Allocation of European Union Allowances. Lessons, Unifying Themes and General Principles. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
