G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP5843
DP5843 The Allocation of European Union Allowances. Lessons, Unifying Themes and General Principles
Carlo Carraro; A Denny Ellerman; Barbara Buchner
发表日期2006-09-23
出版年2006
语种英语
摘要We investigate the outcome of bargaining when a player?s pay-off from agreement is risky. We find that a risk-averse player typically increases his equilibrium receipts when his pay-off is made risky. This is because the presence of risk makes individuals behave 'more patiently' in bargaining. Strong analogies are drawn to the precautionary saving literature. We show that the effect of risk on receipts can be sufficiently strong that a decreasingly risk-averse player may be better off receiving a risky pay-off than a certain pay-off.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Nash bargaining Rubinstein bargaining Risk aversion Prudence
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp5843
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534683
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Carlo Carraro,A Denny Ellerman,Barbara Buchner. DP5843 The Allocation of European Union Allowances. Lessons, Unifying Themes and General Principles. 2006.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Carlo Carraro]的文章
[A Denny Ellerman]的文章
[Barbara Buchner]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Carlo Carraro]的文章
[A Denny Ellerman]的文章
[Barbara Buchner]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Carlo Carraro]的文章
[A Denny Ellerman]的文章
[Barbara Buchner]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。