G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP5870
DP5870 Peers at Work
Enrico Moretti; Alexandre Mas
发表日期2006-10-08
出版年2006
语种英语
摘要This paper presents a model that relates a multinational firm's optimal debt policy to taxation and to non-tax factors such as the desire to prevent bankruptcy. The model yields the predictions that a multinational's indebtedness in a country depends on national tax rates and differences between national and foreign tax rates. These differences matter as multinationals have an incentive to shift debt to high-tax countries. The predictions of the model are tested with the aid of a broad European data set combining firm-level data and information on the international tax treatment of dividend and interest streams. Corporate debt policy indeed appears to reflect national corporate tax rates and international corporate tax rate differences but not non-resident dividend withholding taxes.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Corporate taxation Financial structure Debt shifting
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp5870
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534704
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Enrico Moretti,Alexandre Mas. DP5870 Peers at Work. 2006.
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