| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5870 |
| DP5870 Peers at Work | |
| Enrico Moretti; Alexandre Mas | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-10-08 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper presents a model that relates a multinational firm's optimal debt policy to taxation and to non-tax factors such as the desire to prevent bankruptcy. The model yields the predictions that a multinational's indebtedness in a country depends on national tax rates and differences between national and foreign tax rates. These differences matter as multinationals have an incentive to shift debt to high-tax countries. The predictions of the model are tested with the aid of a broad European data set combining firm-level data and information on the international tax treatment of dividend and interest streams. Corporate debt policy indeed appears to reflect national corporate tax rates and international corporate tax rate differences but not non-resident dividend withholding taxes. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Corporate taxation Financial structure Debt shifting |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5870 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534704 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Enrico Moretti,Alexandre Mas. DP5870 Peers at Work. 2006. |
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