| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5880 |
| DP5880 The Discrete Choice Analytically Flexible (DCAF) Model of Demand for Differentiated Products | |
| peter davis | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-10-08 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider sequential auctions in which bidders are allowed to acquire multiple objects. Learning is an important aspect in these auctions as bidders, who are unaware of their opponents? type, learn about them. Each bidder has an incentive to deceive her opponents from learning about her true type, the deception effect. Hence, the deception effect accounts only for the bidder?s action to affect the opponents? beliefs about her type. In contrast, the extraction effect accounts for the bidder?s action to lower her bid in order to extract information about her opponents? types. We show that the extraction effect lowers the auctioneer?s revenue more (less) than the deception effect when the probability of having a high-value opponent is low (high). |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Information revelation Learning Sequential auctions Asymmetric information Deception Uncertainty |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5880 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534714 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | peter davis. DP5880 The Discrete Choice Analytically Flexible (DCAF) Model of Demand for Differentiated Products. 2006. |
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