全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP5896 Learning About the Term Structure and Optimal Rules for Inflation Targeting

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP5896
	DP5896 Learning About the Term Structure and Optimal Rules for Inflation Targeting
	Eric Schaling; Sylvester Eijffinger; Mewael F. Tesfaselassie
发表日期	2006-10-15
出版年	2006
语种	英语
摘要	I develop a model of rent seeking with informational foundations and an arbitrary number of rent seekers, and I compare the results with Tullock's (1980) classic model where the influence activities are "black-boxed." Given the microfoundations, the welfare consequences of rent seeking can be studied. In particular, I show that competition among rent seekers can be socially beneficial, since the additional information that the decision maker gets access to makes the increase in rent-seeking expenditures worthwhile. However, the analysis also highlights a logic that, under natural parameter assumptions, makes the rent seekers spend more resources on rent seeking than is in society's interest, which is consistent with the spirit of the rent-seeking literature.
主题	Industrial Organization ; Public Economics
关键词	Rent seeking Competition Information acquisition Disclosure Welfare
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp5896
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534728
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Eric Schaling,Sylvester Eijffinger,Mewael F. Tesfaselassie. DP5896 Learning About the Term Structure and Optimal Rules for Inflation Targeting. 2006.