| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5900 |
| DP5900 Mixed Oligopoly Equilibria When Firms' Objectives Are Endogenous | |
| John E Roemer; Philippe De Donder | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-10-15 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Why is underdevelopment so persistent? One explanation is that poor countries do not have institutions that can support growth. Because institutions (both good and bad) are persistent, underdevelopment is persistent. An alternative view is that underdevelopment comes from poor education. Neither explanation is fully satisfactory, the first because it does not explain why poor economic institutions persist even in fairly democratic but poor societies, and the second because it does not explain why poor education is so persistent. This paper tries to reconcile these two views by arguing that the underlying cause of underdevelopment is the initial distribution of factor endowments. Under certain circumstances, this leads to self-interested constituencies that, in equilibrium, perpetuate the status quo. In other words, poor education policy might well be the proximate cause of underdevelopment, but the deeper (and more long lasting cause) are the initial conditions (like the initial distribution of education) that determine political constituencies, their power, and their incentives. Though the initial conditions may well be a legacy of the colonial past, and may well create a perverse political equilibrium of stagnation, persistence does not require the presence of coercive political institutions. We present some suggestive empirical evidence. On the one hand, such an analysis offers hope that the destiny of societies is not preordained by the institutions they inherited through historical accident. On the other hand, it suggests we need to understand better how to alter factor endowments when societies may not have the internal will to do so. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Labour Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Human capital Institutions |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5900 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534730 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | John E Roemer,Philippe De Donder. DP5900 Mixed Oligopoly Equilibria When Firms' Objectives Are Endogenous. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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