G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP5922
DP5922 Imposed Institutions and Preferences for Redistribution
Mark Gradstein; Alberto Chong
发表日期2006-10-29
出版年2006
语种英语
摘要Rational investors perceive correctly the value of financial information. Investment in information is therefore rewarded with a higher Sharpe ratio. Overconfident investors overstate the quality of their own information, and thus attain a lower Sharpe ratio. We contrast the implications of the two models using a unique survey of customers of an Italian leading bank with portfolio data and measures of financial information. We find that the portfolio Sharpe ratio is negatively associated with investment in information. The negative correlation is stronger for men than women and for those who claim they know stocks well, arguably because these investors are more likely to be overconfident. We also show that investment in information is associated with more frequent trading, less delegation of portfolio decisions and less diversified portfolios. In each case, the effect of information is stronger for investors who, a priori, are suspected to be more overconfident.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Portfolio choice Rationality Overconfidence Behavioural finance
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp5922
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534754
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Mark Gradstein,Alberto Chong. DP5922 Imposed Institutions and Preferences for Redistribution. 2006.
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