全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP5923 Voting Over Type and Generosity of a Pension System When Some Individuals are Myopic

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP5923
	DP5923 Voting Over Type and Generosity of a Pension System When Some Individuals are Myopic
	Pierre Pestieau; Helmuth Cremer; Philippe De Donder; Darío Maldonado
发表日期	2006-10-29
出版年	2006
语种	英语
摘要	This paper develops an industry equilibrium model of vertical integration under contractual imperfections with specific input suppliers and external investors. I assume that vertical integration economizes on the needs for contracts with specific input suppliers at the cost of higher financial requirements. I show that the two forms of contractual imperfections have different effects on the degree of vertical integration, and that contractual frictions with external investors affect vertical integration through two opposing channels: a direct negative, investment, effect and an indirect positive, entry, effect. Using cross-country-industry data, I present novel evidence on the institutional determinants of international differences in vertical integration which is consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model. In particular, I show that countries with more developed financial systems are relatively more vertically integrated in industries that are dominated by large firms.
主题	Development Economics
关键词	Vertical integration Credit constraints Contract enforcement Developing countries Industry equilibrium
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp5923
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534755
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Pierre Pestieau,Helmuth Cremer,Philippe De Donder,et al. DP5923 Voting Over Type and Generosity of a Pension System When Some Individuals are Myopic. 2006.