G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP5913
DP5913 Politician Preferences and Caps on Political Lobbying
Tuvana Pastine; Ivan Pastine
发表日期2006-11-12
出版年2006
语种英语
摘要When similar patterns of expansion and contraction are observed across sectors, we call this a business cycle. Yet explaining the similarity and synchronization of these cycles across industries remains a puzzle. Whereas output growth across industries is highly correlated, identifiable shocks, like shocks to productivity, are far less correlated. While previous work has examined complementarities in production, we propose that sectors make similar input decisions because of complementarities in information acquisition. Because information about driving forces has a high fixed cost of production and a low marginal cost of replication, it can be more efficient for firms to share the cost of discovering common shocks than to invest in uncovering detailed sectoral information. Firms basing their decisions on this common information make highly correlated production choices. This mechanism amplifies the effects of common shocks, relative to sectoral shocks.
主题Financial Economics ; International Macroeconomics ; Public Economics
关键词Business cycles Comovement puzzle Costly information Information markets
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp5913
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534765
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Tuvana Pastine,Ivan Pastine. DP5913 Politician Preferences and Caps on Political Lobbying. 2006.
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