| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5935 |
| DP5935 Frictional Wage Dispersion in Search Models: A Quantitative Approach | |
| Giovanni L. Violante; Andreas Hornstein | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-11-12 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider a setting in which two potential merger partners each possess private information pertaining both to the profitability of the merged entity and to stand-alone profits, and investigate the extent to which this private information makes ex-post regret an unavoidable phenomenon in merger negotiations. To this end, we consider ex-post mechanisms, which use both players' reports to determine whether or not a merger will take place and what each player will earn in each case. When the outside option of at least one player is known, the efficient merger decision can be implemented by such a mechanism under plausible budget-balance requirements. When neither outside option is known, we show that the potential for regret-free implementation is much more limited, unless the budget balance condition is relaxed to permit money-burning in the case of false reports. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Mergers Mechanism design Asymmetric information Interdependent valuations Efficient mechanisms |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5935 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534767 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giovanni L. Violante,Andreas Hornstein. DP5935 Frictional Wage Dispersion in Search Models: A Quantitative Approach. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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