| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5925 |
| DP5925 Outsourcing, Complementary Innovations and Growth | |
| Gianmarco Ottaviano; Alireza Naghavi | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-11-19 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine how a multinational's choice to centralize or de-centralize its decision structure is affected by country tax differentials. Within a simple model that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of transfer prices in MNEs - here, as a strategic pre-commitment device and a tax manipulation instrument - we show that decentralization is preferred in case of small tax differentials, whereas centralization can be more profitable, when tax differentials are large. In essence, the organizational flexibility of MNEs is triggered by the scope for tax minimization. Our analysis allows for both commitment and non-commitment to transfer prices, and for alternative modes of competition. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Centralized vs. de-centralized decisions Taxes Transfer prices Mnes |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5925 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534770 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gianmarco Ottaviano,Alireza Naghavi. DP5925 Outsourcing, Complementary Innovations and Growth. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
