全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP5940 The Bell Jar: Commercial Interest Rates between Two Revolutions, 1688-1789

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP5940
	DP5940 The Bell Jar: Commercial Interest Rates between Two Revolutions, 1688-1789
	Marc Flandreau; Clemens Jobst; Pilar Nogues-Marco; Christophe Galimard
发表日期	2006-11-19
出版年	2006
语种	英语
摘要	This paper extends Che and Gale (1998) by allowing the incumbent politician to have a preference for the policy position of one of the lobbyists. The effect of a contribution cap is analyzed where two lobbyists contest for a political prize. The cap always helps the lobbyist whose policy position is preferred by the politician no matter whether it is the high-valuation or the low-valuation contestant. In contrast to Che and Gale, once the cap is binding a more restrictive cap always reduces expected aggregate contributions. However, the politician might support the legislation of a barely binding cap. When politician policy preferences perfectly reflect the will of the people, a more restrictive cap is always welfare increasing. When lobbyist's valuations completely internalize all social costs and benefits, a cap is welfare improving if and only if the politician favors the high-value policy. Even a barely binding cap can have significant welfare consequences.
主题	Industrial Organization
关键词	All-pay auction Campaign finance reform Explicit ceiling
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp5940
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534774
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Marc Flandreau,Clemens Jobst,Pilar Nogues-Marco,et al. DP5940 The Bell Jar: Commercial Interest Rates between Two Revolutions, 1688-1789. 2006.