| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5947 |
| DP5947 Risk, Uncertainty and Asset Prices | |
| Geert Bekaert; Yuhang Xing; Eric Engstrom | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-11-19 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper presents a model of nation formation in which culturally heterogeneous agents vote on the optimal level of public spending. Larger nations benefit from increasing returns in the provision of public goods, but bear the costs of greater cultural heterogeneity. This tradeoff induces agents' preferences over different geographical configurations, thus determining the likelihood of secession and unification. We provide empirical support for choosing genetic distances as a proxy of cultural heterogeneity. By using data on genetic distances, we examine the stability of the current map of Europe and identify the regions prone to secession and the countries that are more likely to merge. Our framework is further applied to estimate the welfare gains from European Union membership. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Nation formation Genetic diversity Cultural heterogeneity Secession Unification European union |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5947 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534779 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Geert Bekaert,Yuhang Xing,Eric Engstrom. DP5947 Risk, Uncertainty and Asset Prices. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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