| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5958 |
| DP5958 Garbled Elections | |
| Patrick W. Schmitz; Thomas Tröger | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-11-26 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyzes the organization of firms in a dynamic setting with endogenous growth to shed light on the link between economic growth and the parallel creation and adoption of complementary innovations by independent labs and plants. In the presence of search friction and incomplete outsourcing contracts, we show that the ex-post bargaining power of upstream and downstream parties at the production stage feeds back into innovation and growth. Our dynamic perspective reveals a tension between the static and dynamic effects of outsourcing. The reason is that firms make their organizational choices weighting the higher searching and contracting costs of outsourcing against the higher entry and foregone specialization costs of vertical integration. In so doing, they neglect the effects of their choices on innovation and growth. Hence, when outsourcing is selected, the static gains from specialized production may at times be associated with relevant dynamic losses for consumers. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Incomplete contracts Growth Organization of firms Welfare Outsourcing Complementary innovations |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5958 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534796 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick W. Schmitz,Thomas Tröger. DP5958 Garbled Elections. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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