| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5959 |
| DP5959 Governance Reform in Legal Service Markets | |
| Paul A Grout; Ian Jewitt; Silvia Sonderegger | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-11-26 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | I study how savers allocate funds between boundedly rational firms which follow simple pricing rules. Firms need cash to pay their inputs in advance, and savers-shareholders allocate cash between them so as to maximize their rate of return. When the rate of return on each firm is observed, there are multiple equilibria, and some degree of monopoly power is sustained. However, the economy gets close to the Walrasian equilibrium when the availability of funds goes to infinity. Multiple equilibria also arise when there are ?entrants? with unobservable rates of return. In an equilibrium where entrants are not funded, savers invest in incumbents because those entrants which will divert customers from incumbents are likely to be excess underpricers. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Selection Evolution Credit allocation Winner's curse Bounded rationality |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5959 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534797 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Paul A Grout,Ian Jewitt,Silvia Sonderegger. DP5959 Governance Reform in Legal Service Markets. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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