| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5962 |
| DP5962 Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee under Endogenous Supervision | |
| Martin Kocher; Dennis Dittrich | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-12-03 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | When regulated markets are liberalized, economists always stress the benefits of fragmenting existing capacities among more firms. This is because oligopoly models typically imply that a larger number of firms generates stronger competition. I show in this paper that this intuition may fail under collusion. When individual firms are capacity constrained relative to total demand, the fragmentation of capacity facilitates collusion and increases the highest sustainable collusive price. This result can explain the finding in Sweeting (2005) that dramatic fragmentation of generation capacity in the English electricity industry led to increasing price cost margins. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Market fragmentation Collusion Bertrand-edgeworth competition Industry restructuring |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5962 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534804 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Martin Kocher,Dennis Dittrich. DP5962 Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee under Endogenous Supervision. 2006. |
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