G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP5971
DP5971 Claiming More: The Increased Voluminosity of Patent Applications and its Determinants
Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie; Dominique Guellec; Nicolas van Zeebroeck
发表日期2006-12-03
出版年2006
语种英语
摘要Majority rules are frequently used to decide whether or not a public good should be provided, but will typically fail to achieve an efficient provision. We provide a worst-case analysis of the majority rule with an optimally chosen majority threshold, assuming that voters have independent private valuations and are ex-ante symmetric (provision cost shares are included in the valuations). We show that if the population is large it can happen that the optimal majority rule is essentially no better than a random provision of the public good. But the optimal majority rule is worst-case asymptotically efficient in the large-population limit if (i) the voters' expected valuation is bounded away from 0, and (ii) an absolute bound for valuations is known.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Majority rule Public goods
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp5971
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534809
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie,Dominique Guellec,Nicolas van Zeebroeck. DP5971 Claiming More: The Increased Voluminosity of Patent Applications and its Determinants. 2006.
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