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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP5971 |
DP5971 Claiming More: The Increased Voluminosity of Patent Applications and its Determinants | |
Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie; Dominique Guellec; Nicolas van Zeebroeck | |
发表日期 | 2006-12-03 |
出版年 | 2006 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Majority rules are frequently used to decide whether or not a public good should be provided, but will typically fail to achieve an efficient provision. We provide a worst-case analysis of the majority rule with an optimally chosen majority threshold, assuming that voters have independent private valuations and are ex-ante symmetric (provision cost shares are included in the valuations). We show that if the population is large it can happen that the optimal majority rule is essentially no better than a random provision of the public good. But the optimal majority rule is worst-case asymptotically efficient in the large-population limit if (i) the voters' expected valuation is bounded away from 0, and (ii) an absolute bound for valuations is known. |
主题 | Industrial Organization |
关键词 | Majority rule Public goods |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5971 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534809 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie,Dominique Guellec,Nicolas van Zeebroeck. DP5971 Claiming More: The Increased Voluminosity of Patent Applications and its Determinants. 2006. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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