| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP5991
|
| DP5991 The Economics of Prozac (Do Employees Really Gain from Strong Employment Protection?) |
| Etienne Wasmer
|
| 发表日期 | 2006-12-10
|
| 出版年 | 2006
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | In immature democracies, businessmen run for public office to gain direct control over policy; in mature democracies they typically rely on other means of influence. We develop a simple model to show that businessmen run for office only when two conditions hold. First, as in many immature democracies, institutions that make reneging on campaign promises costly must be poorly developed. In such environments, office holders have monopoly power that can be used to extract rents, and businessmen run to capture those rents. Second, the returns to businessmen from policy influence must not be too large, as otherwise high rents from holding office draw professional politicians into the race, crowding out businessmen candidates. Analysis of data on Russian gubernatorial elections supports these predictions. Businessman candidates are less likely 1) in regions with high media freedom and government transparency, institutions that raise the cost of reneging on campaign promises, and 2) in regions where returns to policy influence (measured by regional resource abundance) are large, but only where media are unfree and government nontransparent. |
| 主题 | Development Economics
; Public Economics
|
| 关键词 | Political connections
Businessman candidates
Immature democracy
Media freedom
Government transparency
Strength of political parties
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5991
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534826
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Etienne Wasmer. DP5991 The Economics of Prozac (Do Employees Really Gain from Strong Employment Protection?). 2006.
|
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
