| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5997 |
| DP5997 Deflationary Shocks and Monetary Rules: An Open-Economy Scenario Analysis | |
| Paolo Pesenti; Doug Laxton; Papa N'Diaye | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-12-10 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We extend the discussion of redistributive politics across electoral systems to allow for taxation to be distortionary. We allow politicians to choose any tax rate between zero and unity and then redistribute the money collected. We build on the model put forward by Myerson (1993) and Lizzeri and Persico (2001 and 2005) to show that the use of distortionnary taxation can be understood as an analysis of the trade-off between efficiency and targetability. We derive the equilibrium taxes and redistribution schemes with distortions. We show that the presence of distortions makes full taxation unattractive. We also derive the size of the government, the deadweight loss and inequality as a function of distortions. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Redistributive politics Distortionary taxation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5997 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534831 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Paolo Pesenti,Doug Laxton,Papa N'Diaye. DP5997 Deflationary Shocks and Monetary Rules: An Open-Economy Scenario Analysis. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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