| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6002 |
| DP6002 Subjective Welfare, Isolation and Relative Consumption | |
| Marcel Fafchamps; Forhad Shilpi | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-12-10 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Two central results in the strategic trade literature are that governments shall support winners and that there is a policy prisoner dilemma in international subsidy wars (i.e. countries have incentives to support local firms but they would be better off by cooperating to not intervene). We show that exactly the contrary holds when asymmetries between firms are endogenous. Specifically, the incentives to support are bigger for loser firms given that intervention can aim at making them winners (competitiveness shifting effects). As a result the countries that host less competitive firms always prefer intervention. We illustrate this with the Airbus-Boeing case. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | R&d investment Airbus Boeing R&d subsidies Asymmetric firms |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6002 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534835 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marcel Fafchamps,Forhad Shilpi. DP6002 Subjective Welfare, Isolation and Relative Consumption. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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