| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6009 |
| DP6009 Competition Fosters Trust | |
| Jean-Robert Tyran; Steffen Huck; Gabriele K. Ruchala | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-12-17 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the effects of reputation and competition in a stylized market for experience goods. If interaction is anonymous, such markets perform poorly: sellers are not trustworthy, and buyers do not trust sellers. If sellers are identifiable and can, hence, build a reputation, efficiency quadruples but is still at only a third of the first best. Adding more information by granting buyers access to all sellers? complete history has, somewhat surprisingly, no effect. On the other hand, we find that competition, coupled with some minimal information, eliminates the trust problem almost completely. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Experience goods Competition Reputation Trust Moral hazard Information conditions |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6009 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534845 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jean-Robert Tyran,Steffen Huck,Gabriele K. Ruchala. DP6009 Competition Fosters Trust. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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