| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6045 |
| DP6045 Political Connections and Preferential Access to Finance: The Role of Campaign Contributions | |
| Stijn Claessens; Luc Laeven; Erik Feijen | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-01-14 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Using novel indicators of political connections constructed from campaign contribution data, we show that Brazilian firms that provided contributions to (elected) federal deputies experienced higher stock returns than firms that don?t around the 1998 and 2002 elections. This suggests contributions help shape policy on a firm-specific basis. Using a firm fixed effects framework to mitigate the risk that unobserved firm characteristics distort the results, we find that contributing firms substantially increased their bank financing relative to a control group after each election, indicating that access to bank finance is an important channel through which political connections operate. We estimate the economic costs of this rent seeking over the two election cycles to be at least 0.2% of GDP per annum. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Campaign contributions Elections Rent-seeking Preferential lending |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6045 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534879 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Stijn Claessens,Luc Laeven,Erik Feijen. DP6045 Political Connections and Preferential Access to Finance: The Role of Campaign Contributions. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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