| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6025 |
| DP6025 Pricing Patents for Licensing in Standard Setting Organisations: Making Sense of FRAND Commitments | |
| Jorge Padilla; Richard Schmalensee; Anna Layne-Farrar | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-01-21 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In the 'Knightian' theory of entrepreneurship, entrepreneurs provide insurance to workers by paying fixed wages and bear all the risk of production. This paper endogenizes entrepreneurial risk by allowing for optimal insurance contracts as well as the occupational self-selection. Moral hazard prevents full insurance; increases in an agent?s wealth then entail increases in risk borne. Thus, even under decreasing risk aversion, there are robust instances in which workers are wealthier than entrepreneurs. This empirically implausible result suggests that risk-based explanations for entrepreneurship are inadequate. |
| 主题 | Development Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Moral hazard Occupational choice Principal-agent model |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6025 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534893 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jorge Padilla,Richard Schmalensee,Anna Layne-Farrar. DP6025 Pricing Patents for Licensing in Standard Setting Organisations: Making Sense of FRAND Commitments. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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