| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6060 |
| DP6060 Formal and Informal Risk Sharing in LDCs: Theory and Empirical Evidence | |
| Bruno Jullien; Thierry Magnac; Pierre Dubois | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-01-21 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider a financing game with costly enforcement based on Townsend (1979), but where monitoring is non-contractible and allowed to be stochastic. Debt is the optimal contract. Moreover, the debt contract induces creditor leniency and strategic defaults by the borrower on the equilibrium path, consistent with empirical evidence on repayment and monitoring behaviour in credit markets. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Costly state verification Debt contract Priority violation Strategic defaults |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6060 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534898 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Bruno Jullien,Thierry Magnac,Pierre Dubois. DP6060 Formal and Informal Risk Sharing in LDCs: Theory and Empirical Evidence. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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