| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6062 |
| DP6062 Solving Heterogeneous-Agent Models with Parameterized Cross-Sectional Distributions | |
| Wouter Den Haan; Yann Algan; Olivier Allais | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-01-21 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyses the relation between authority and incentives. It extends the standard principal--agent model by a project selection stage in which the principal can either delegate the choice of project to the agent or keep the authority. The agent's subsequent choice of effort depends both on monetary incentives and the selected project. We find that the consideration of effort incentives makes the principal less likely to delegate the authority over projects to the agent. In fact, if the agent is protected by limited liability, delegation is never optimal. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Authority Delegation Limited liability Moral hazard Principal-agent problem |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6062 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534900 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Wouter Den Haan,Yann Algan,Olivier Allais. DP6062 Solving Heterogeneous-Agent Models with Parameterized Cross-Sectional Distributions. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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