全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP6078 Outsourcing Tariff Evasion: A New Explanation for Entrepôt Trade

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP6078
	DP6078 Outsourcing Tariff Evasion: A New Explanation for Entrepôt Trade
	Shang-Jin Wei; Raymond Fisman; Peter Moustakerski
发表日期	2007-02-14
出版年	2007
语种	英语
摘要	The political distortions in public investment projects are investigated within the context of a bipartisan political economy framework. The role of scrapping and modifying projects of previous governments receives special attention. The party in government has an incentive to overspend on large ideological public investment projects in order to bind the hands of its successor. This leads to a bias for excessive debt, especially if the probability of being removed from office is large. These political distortions have implications for the appropriate format of a fiscal rule. A deficit rule, like the Stability and Growth Pact, mitigates the overspending bias in ideological investment projects and improves social welfare. The optimal second-best restriction on public debt exceeds the level of public debt that would prevail under the socially optimal outcome. Social welfare may be boosted even more by appropriate investment restrictions: with a restriction on (future) investment in ideological projects, the current government perceives a large benefit of a debt reduction. However, debt and investment restrictions are not needed if investment projects only have a financial return.
主题	International Macroeconomics
关键词	Bipartisan Public investment Ideological projects Market projects Scrapping public investment Golden rule Investment restriction Deficit rule Political economy
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp6078
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534917
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Shang-Jin Wei,Raymond Fisman,Peter Moustakerski. DP6078 Outsourcing Tariff Evasion: A New Explanation for Entrepôt Trade. 2007.