| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP6081
|
| DP6081 The Gambler's and Hot-Hand Fallacies: Theory and Applications |
| Dimitri Vayanos; Matthew Rabin
|
| 发表日期 | 2007-02-14
|
| 出版年 | 2007
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | This paper studies the role of structural remedies in merger control in a Cournot setting where (endogenous) mergers are motivated by prospective efficiency gains and must be submitted to an Antitrust Authority (AA) which might require partial divestiture for approval. Both positive and negative effects of merger remedies are identified. First, structural remedies create new merger opportunities to firms. Second, when divestitures are required, the AA over-fixes, i.e., goes beyond the recreation of the level of competition that existed prior to the transaction. Finally, by insisting in over-fixing, the AA may discourage firms to look for more efficient mergers, inducing a final outcome where consumers' surplus is lower than if divestitures couldn't be required. Overall, however, structural remedies are shown to be good: consumers' surplus ex-ante is higher with than without remedies. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | Efficiency gains
Endogenous mergers
Failing firm defence.
Merger remedies
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6081
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534920
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Dimitri Vayanos,Matthew Rabin. DP6081 The Gambler's and Hot-Hand Fallacies: Theory and Applications. 2007.
|
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