| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6091 |
| DP6091 Royalty Stacking in High Tech Industries: Separating Myth from Reality | |
| Jorge Padilla; Anna Layne-Farrar; Damien Geradin | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-02-14 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze a game of two-sided private information characterized by extreme adverse selection, and study a special case in the laboratory. Each player has a privately known "strength" and can decide to fight or compromise. If either chooses to fight, there is a conflict; the stronger player receives a high payoff and the weaker player receives a low payoff. If both choose to compromise, conflict is avoided and each receives an intermediate payoff. The only equilibrium in both the sequential and simultaneous versions of the game is for players to always fight, independent of their own strength. In our experiment, we observe among other things (i) frequent compromise, (ii) little evidence of learning, and (iii) different behaviour between first, second and simultaneous movers. We explore several models in an attempt to understand the reasons underlying these anomalous choices, including quantal response equilibrium, cognitive hierarchy, and cursed equilibrium. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Adverse selection Behavioural game theory Laboratory experiment |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6091 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534930 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jorge Padilla,Anna Layne-Farrar,Damien Geradin. DP6091 Royalty Stacking in High Tech Industries: Separating Myth from Reality. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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