| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6092 |
| DP6092 Debt and the Effects of Fiscal Policy | |
| Francesco Giavazzi; Carlo A. Favero | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-02-14 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Does vertical integration reduce or increase transaction costs with external investors? This paper analyzes an incomplete contracts model of vertical integration in which a seller and a buyer with no cash need to finance investments for production. The firm is modeled as a "nexus of contracts" across the intermediate input supply and the financing transaction. The costs and benefits of vertical integration depend on the relative importance of a positive "contractual centralization" effect against a negative "de-monitoring" effect: the firm centrally organizes the nexus of contracts reducing the extent of contractual externalities while the market disciplines decisions driven by private benefits. Larger projects, more specific assets, and low investors protection are determinants of vertical integration. |
| 主题 | Development Economics ; Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Contractual externalities Investors protection Limited liability Theory of the firm Vertical integration |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6092 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534931 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Francesco Giavazzi,Carlo A. Favero. DP6092 Debt and the Effects of Fiscal Policy. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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