| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6103 |
| DP6103 The Compromise Game: Two-sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory | |
| Juan Carrillo; Thomas R Palfrey | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-02-14 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper questions whether competition can replace sector-specific regulation of mobile telecommunications. We show that the monopolistic outcome prevails independently of market concentration when access prices are determined in bilateral negotiations. A light-handed regulatory policy can induce effective competition. Call prices are close to the marginal cost if the networks are sufficiently close substitutes. Neither demand nor cost information is required. A unique and symmetric call price equilibrium exists under symmetric access prices, provided that call demand is sufficiently inelastic. Existence encompasses the case of many networks and high network substitutability. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Access price competition Entry Network competition Network substitutability Regulation Two-way access |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6103 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534942 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Juan Carrillo,Thomas R Palfrey. DP6103 The Compromise Game: Two-sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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