| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6126 |
| DP6126 Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud? | |
| Luigi Zingales; Alexander Dyck; Adair Morse | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-02-14 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Any factor that makes acquisition more appealing should increase the number of acquisition that occur. This idea has been captured in standard static models in the literature. However, an increase in the number of acquisitions today means fewer firms exist to perform acquisitions in the future. This dynamic, which we explore, is not well understood. We study a model of mergers motivated by efficient reallocation of projects. A firm may conceive a project that it may not be able to develop successfully. It can be acquired by an established firm that has already proved its ability to develop such projects successfully. We find that, when acquisition costs are low established firms acquire young firms (but not other established firms) in the steady state. More strikingly, if the likelihood of project success decreases for young firms, we find that a higher fraction of young firms attempt to develop their projects rather than to be acquired. This contrasts the previous literature's findings on acquisitions. The explanation for this result is that an increased likelihood of firms' failures causes a shortage of established firms that can then acquire new young firms. Finally, if acquisition costs are moderate we find that established firms acquire other established firms, but not young firms. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Firm's life cycle Mergers as reallocation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6126 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534964 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Luigi Zingales,Alexander Dyck,Adair Morse. DP6126 Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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