| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6138 |
| DP6138 Macroeconomic Implications of Size-Dependent Policies | |
| Nezih Guner; Gustavo Ventura; Daniel Yi Xu | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-02-23 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors or he can ask for further evidence from the two parties to the conflict. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favour at a cost. The arbiter is concerned about accuracy and low procedural costs. When both parties testify, each of them distorts the evidence less than when they testify alone. When the fixed cost of testifying is low, the arbiter hears both, for intermediate values one, and for high values no party at all. The arbiter's ability to remain uninformed as well as sequential testifying makes it more likely that the arbiter requires evidence. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Adversarial Costly state falsification Evidence production Inquisitorial Multi-sender game |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6138 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534977 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nezih Guner,Gustavo Ventura,Daniel Yi Xu. DP6138 Macroeconomic Implications of Size-Dependent Policies. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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