| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP6149 |
| DP6149 Financial Integration, Financial Deepness and Global Imbalances | |
| Enrique Mendoza; Vincenzo Quadrini | |
| 发表日期 | 2007-02-23 |
| 出版年 | 2007 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Casual observation suggests that capital allocation is often driven by favouritism and connections rather than by market mechanisms and information on future expected returns. We investigate when favouritism or markets emerge as an equilibrium outcome in the allocation of capital. We show that when information is unreliable and costly, financiers do not have incentives to investigate distant investment opportunities and allocate capital to entrepreneurs they are familiar with (favouritism). If the pool of saving is relatively small, favouritism can lead to an efficient allocation of investment. As the economy develops and its pool of saving increases, information production and the identification of distant investment opportunities (markets) become crucial for efficient investment decisions. Nevertheless, favouritism may emerge in equilibrium and investors may find it optimal to fund low quality entrepreneurs if they are familiar with them. Since competition for capital is low in an equilibrium with favouritism, entrepreneurs enjoy high rents. Thus, even high quality entrepreneurs may have no incentive to join markets with standards that foster information acquisition, but rather run inefficiently small firms. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Finance and growth Information production Competition for capital Exchange competition |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp6149 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534988 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Enrique Mendoza,Vincenzo Quadrini. DP6149 Financial Integration, Financial Deepness and Global Imbalances. 2007. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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